General Stefan Gusa unintentionally confirms Hungarian claims of communicating locational data on Securitate transmitters to the Romanian Army in December 1989

Although the following interview included in the volume Condamnat la Adevar (http://www.fundatiagusa.ro/assets/files/Media%20presa%20PDF/CONDAMNAT-LA-ADEVAR—GENERAL-STEFAN-GUSA.pdf) starts out similarly to the interview published by Pavel Corut in several of his books in (1993/1994), there are parts of this (recorded/transcribed) interview I either missed in his books or were never included in them.  One of the more interesting episodes is his discussion of being contacted by the Hungarian military, who gave precise information on the exact location of, Gusa claims, the Securitate and DIA transmitters, which he put at the disposition of the Romanian military in order to destroy them and get rid of the “terrorists.”  Even if this is the first we have heard of DIA transmitters (and I question whether this is true, as all previous accounts talk only about Securitate transmitters…because after all, Gusa tries to argue that by targeting both, it was proof that the Hungarians weren’t just interested in going after alleged Securitate terrorists, but were targeting Romanian “national security” and/or attempting to “test” his patriotism!), it is significant for a number of reasons:

1. Gusa claims he refused the offer and thought it suspicious.  This is at variance with what the Hungarians (former CHOD, Defense Minister, PM and others said at the time and since), that when dealing with Stanculescu, they conveyed that information, and by passing it to Stanculescu, they were able to witness that those locations were slowly taken out of service, presumably as the Romanian military moved to shut them down.
2. This suggests once again, that the “Timisoara variant”–so popular among residents of Timisoara, that the post-22 terrorist phase was created/manipulated by those who had blood on their hands for the Timisoara repression–namely, Stanculescu, Gusa, and Chitac–is simply wrong.  Stanculescu, who set up shop in the MApN building, and Gusa, who set up shop with Securitate Director, General Iulian Vlad, were not on the same side…as the different accounts about how aid from the Hungarians was viewed.  Stanculescu accepted it…Gusa rejected it.  In the first scenario, this was locational aid directed solely against the Securitate because they were the “terrorists”…in the second scenario, the Hungarians were trying to take advantage of the situation to make the Romanian military destroy sites of “national security” and no Securitate-terrorists existed.  It is pretty clear which of these is truthful and which is not.
3. Pavel Corut, former Directorate IV, CI-ist, tells Gusa that he has heard the tape of the conversation between Arady and Gusa, because Securitate Unit 0110 recorded it at the time.  If true, this of course is further evidence that the Securitate was still active and not under Army control at this time, and that they were not “with the Revolution.”

(Anyway, I will probably return to further develop this post; thank you for your interest and readership)