(a serialized version of the original draft for my contribution in Tragatori si Mistificatori: Contrarevolutia Securitatii in decembrie 1989 (Polirom, 2019), Andrei Ursu, Roland O. Thomasson, and Madalin Hodor)
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- Who the ROMBAC transported to Sibiu on the night of 20 December 1989
A second, less baffling, but nonetheless telling case is how the Indictment treats the controversy of supplemental forces sent by airplane from Bucharest on the night of 20 December to the city of Sibiu. These forces have been suspected in playing a role in the repression of demonstrators before 22 December 1989 and/or in the violence that followed—meaning that its significance is two-fold.
The Indictment explains:
Despre evenimentele desfăşurate la Sibiu mai există o controversă. S-a speculat în perioada post-decembristă că la data de 20 decembrie 1989, pentru protecţia suplimentară a lui Ceauşescu Nicu, la Sibiu a fost trimisă, în regim conspirat , o grupă militară aparţinând DIA (Direcţia Informaţii a Armatei), mai precis militari ai UM 0404 Buzău (cercetare). Aceşti militari ar fi făcut deplasarea spre Sibiu, clandestin, la bordul unei aeronave civile Rombac(BAC – 400) ce asigura ruta Bucureşti – Sibiu. Controversa a apărut şi pentru că ,doar pentru acea dată, cursa a fost efectuată cu o aeronavă Rombac în locul uzualei aeronave de tipul AN – 24. Totuşi ancheta a demonstrat că motivul înlocuirii a fost unul determinat de o necesitate de moment: aeronava Rombac era mai încăpătoare, astfel încât au putut fi transportate toate pachetele trimise din străinătate ( mai ales din RF Germania ) rudelor aflate în zona Sibiu ,dată fiind comunitatea germană numeroasă în această zonă. Aşadar, prezenţa în sine a aeronavei Rombac nu constituie motiv de suspiciune. Cu toate acestea, au existat declaraţii de martor prin care s-a arătat că în perimetrul situat între sediul Inspectoratului Judeţean al MI şi UM 01512 Sibiu au executat trageri cu arme militare automate persoane echipate în combinezoane de culoare neagră, aflate pe terasele blocurilor aflate în apropiere. Relevante în acest sens sunt declaraţiile martorilor Bogdan Viorel (audiat la 08.12.2006 ), Bălăiţă Romulus (audiat la 17.11.2006) şi Verony Viorel (audiat la 13.12.2006). Aceste declaraţii, precum şi alte declaraţii relevante, se află ataşate dosarului, în vol. 1-7 „Sibiu”. [p. 130]
a) The Indictment quotes the witness Rusan Ioan (offices of the SPM, 04.10 2018-11/P/2014, vol. IV-Declarations, ff. 130-135) as saying:
„Cu referire la evenimentele desfăşurate în Sibiu şi nu numai, a fost audiat martorul Rusan Ioan ( sediul SPM, 04.10 2018-11/P/2014, vol.IV – Declaraţii, f.130-135) care a spus: „ În decembrie 1989 eram cadru al DSS şi făceam parte din unitatea 0110 – contraspionaj ţări socialiste. Eu am fost şeful colectivului anti – STASI ( serviciul de informaţii alRD Germană), aşa că am luat contact doar tangenţial cu colegii care desfăşurau activităţi anti – KGB. Într-un interviu pe care l-am acordat mai demult, am spus că în decembrie 1989 puterea a fost preluată chiar de cei pe care-i urmăream noi.(….)După Revoluţie , când îndeplineam funcţia de şef al Departamentului de Informaţii Sibiu (SRI) am primit ordin să efectuez o cercetare în vederea obţinerii de date pentru clarificarea evenimentelor de la Sibiu din decembrie 1989(….)În urma cercetărilor făcute, mi-am format convingerea că aterizarea avionului Rombac la Sibiu în seara zilei de 20 decembrie 1989 a avut rolul de a aduce un comando de militari de la Batalionul 404 Buzău. Aceştia au călătorit împreună cu pasagerii cursei respective. Am luat câteva declaraţii unor pasageri care au declarat că în aeronavă au călătorit şi luptătorii Batalionului 404 Buzău. Am avut şi declaraţia bucătarului de la UM 01512 Sibiu care a precizat că în acea perioadă a hrănit suplimentar un grup de militari despre apartenenţa cărora nu ştia nimic, afirma că nu erau din unitate şi nu se legitimau.” [pp. 128-129; 130-131]
The military prosecutors go on to say that outside of this declaration, there is nothing to confirm the involvement of any special forces in the events of Sibiu, and that the operational diaries of UM 0404 Buzau and of other military documents attached to the file do not reveal any relevant information with regard to the existence of this mission. Nevertheless, the damage is done: the military prosecutors chose a single account to include, one suggesting that the Defense Ministry’s DIA UM 404 Buzau was involved, while presenting no counterveiling information.
b) Although Ioan Rusan’s testimony cited by the military prosecutors is dated October 2018, this is not the first time he has made allegations of DIA operational involvement in Sibiu in 1989. In November 2004, they appeared in the daily of the well-known Securitate collaborator and post-communist media mogul Dan “Felix” Voiculescu, Jurnalul National, in an interview with Alex Mihai Stoenescu, a historian whose writings have routinely minimized Securitate responsibility for wrongdoing and who was on the Securitate payroll before 1989.[1] Needless to say, speaking more broadly, Rusan seeks to suggest that Ceausescu was overthrown by enemies East and West, leaving little room for the spontaneous genuine popular concerns and courage that was at the heart of the uprising in December 1989. Rusan in the November 2004 interview maintains that the uprising was the work of Romanian returnees who had been trained in diversion by foreign intelligence services and infiltrated back into Romania. This is a long-standing Securitate narrative, to be found in the aforementioned letter from the officers of the Fifth Directorate in September 1990, the many interviews of Securitate mouthpiece Angela Bacescu, and the Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad himself.
Nor, of course, is Ioan Rusan the only or even the first former Securitate officer to seek to suggest the forces who came to Sibiu on the ROMBAC on 20 December 1989 were DIA. Valentin Raiha, a former Military Counterintelligence officer (Securitate, Directorate IV) wrote in 1994, “Daca ne gandim ca “securistilor-teroristi” nu li se harazise o soarta pre blanda in cadrul scenariului “Revolutiei”, nu trebuie sa concluzionam ca pasagerii Rombac-ului ar cam trebui cautati in gradina la D.I.A.?”[2] In fact, perhaps the first person to float the hypothesis that those on the plane were DIA, was an anonymous former CI-ist who openly admitted the rivalry and competition between the Fourth Directorate and DIA to the Cluj-based weekly Nu! in 1990 and added, “Despre D.I.A. stiu multe…A doau oara am auzit de un avion care a decolat din Bucuresti de pe Aeroportul Otopeni si nu Baneasa cum era normal, spre Sibiu, avion in care erau doar sapte sibieni si in rest peste 50 de barbati cu valize asematoare, civili, dar cu domiciliu fals: asa am inteles din depozitia col. Rotariu, inspector sef la Sibiu [la Inspectoratul MI].” [3]
It is interesting in this regard to invoke what military authors wrote in the 1990s specifically about Col. Rotariu:
In lucrarea “Lovitura de stat a confiscat Revolutia Romana”, Serban Sandulescu, membru al Comisiei Senatoriale, sustine ideea ca avionul ROMBAC a adus la Sibiu nu uslasi, ci luptatori ai Directiei Informatii a Armatei, argumentand aceasta afirmatie, in principal, cu declaratiile facute de elevi ai U.M. 01512, care, in seara zilei de 20 decembrie 1989, i-au intrebat pe cei adusi in unitate de unde sunt, acestia raspunzand ca sunt de la D.I.A. Fara a cita alte detalii sau nume de oameni, Serban Sandulescu precizeaza ca aceste fapte i-au fost relatate de un redactor de la ziarul “Tribuna” din Sibiu, care urma sa scrie o carte. Pentru sustinerea ipotezei sale adauga “confirmarea obtinuta personal de la un cadru al S.R.I.”, a carui identitate este invaluita in aceleasi anonimat.
Varianta ca in ROMBAC au fost adusi la Sibiu luptatori ai D.I.A. este sustinuta in cartea “Recurs” si de Iulian Rotariu, fost inspector-sef la Inspector-sef la Inspectoratul M.I. Sibiu. Pasagerii avionului–sustine acesta–“nu au apartinut Ministerul de Interne. Din surse care au tinut sa-si pastreze anonimatul, cel circa 80 de pasageri ar fi fost cazati la U.M. 01512 Sibiu, unde au intrat pe poarta 2 si nu pe cea principala. Daca ar fi fost de la M.I. ar fi fost identificati. Mai degraba au facut parte din trupele de cercetare-diversiune subordonate D.I.A.”.
Interesant de retinut este faptul ca varianta D.I.A. este sustinuta, in diferite formule, doar de foste cadre ale M.I., interesate, se pare, sa creeze aceasta diversiune….[4]
c) In other words, the sole testimony presented is from a former Securitate officer, and he echoes and repeats the claims of other former Securitate officers made over the years. Three decades removed from the Ceausescu era, some readers would have little inkling of the “Steaua-Dinamo” (shorthand reference using the Military and Securitate football clubs as proxies for the broader clash) bureaucratic competition and distrust between the military and the Securitate that had come to characterize the late Ceausescu era. No element of the military was regarded as more adversarial by the Securitate than the Army’s DIA unit. And the military and the DIA specifically were keenly aware of efforts by the Securitate to surveil and control them. In his testimony before the so-called Gabrielescu Senatorial Commission investigating December 1989, the head of DIA in December 1989, Rear Admiral Stefan Dinu stated in January 1994 that on paper the Romanian military had 31 military attaches abroad to cover 50 countries; in reality, by December 1989, it had only four, in Budapesta, Belgrada, Paris, si Roma![5] According to Dinu,
Pentru ca, treptat-treptat, datorita poate adversitatii serviciilor de informatii DSS, nu avea interes sa mai existe alaturi de ei, undeva, independent, vreun serviciu de informatii. Aveau intotdeauna obsesia ca nu se lucre correct in aceste servicii—vorbesc de cele externe, ca in tara noi nu aveam nimic—, ofiterilor sub acoperire li se gaseau tot felul de sicane ca sa fie retrasi. Ii retragem si altii nu s-a mai numit nici un atasat militar in exterior.[6]
Moreover, the details we know about DIA make it highly unlikely that it would have been members of this unit who were on the plane. Why? For one, the numbers simply don’t add up. Accounts vary, but most suggest the group of suspicious civilians who boarded the plane was at least 40 in number. Dinu, is quoted as having told the Gabrielescu commission investigating the December events (of which Sandulescu was a member) on 13 January 1994 that “Nu aveam practice 80 de luptatori in acest batalion.”[7] It is known that 41 of them were in Timisoara from the morning of 18 December and only returned to their home base in Buzau on 22 December.[8] This would have left 39 at their base in Buzau and it seems unlikely that all of them would have been dispatched to Sibiu at the same time as half the unit was in Timisoara. Moreover, why would they have traveled to Bucharest before going to Sibiu?
And, finally, and this seems critical, the military had their own aircraft. When the 41 members of this unit were transported to Timisoara they were transported by an AN-24/26, not a ROMBAC, and they were transported by a military plane, not a civilian TAROM aircraft, and they left from the Boboc military airport near Buzau, not from Bucharest. Furthermore, knowing the prefernce of the military for following standard operating procedures (SOPs), why two days after sending their personnel to Timisoara by military aircraft would they now choose a TAROM flight with civilian passengers on board? (And, although there are some important differences in circumstances, when (I.G.M.) Militia Generals Nuta and Mihalcea, and the Militia and Securitate personnel with them, fled Timisoara to Arad on 22 December 1989, they flew with a civilian ROMBAC, not a military aircraft.) The DIA hypothesis thus makes little sense from the standpoint of numbers, equipment, and SOPs.
It isn’t just that the DIA hypothesis floated by the Indictment is unlikely, but that the military prosecutors fail to mention the existence of competing accounts, in particular the first post-December account, which suggested that the mystery personnel aboard the ROMBAC were Securitate USLA personnel. Even the 1996 Gabrielescu Commission Report that the military prosecutors periodically invoke and cite from in the document, including about Sibiu, mentioned this initial account before dismissing it in favor of the DIA hypothesis. That this first competing account was a major competing hypothesis can be seen in Siani-Davies 2005 study of the Revolution where he states:
Controversy also continues to surround a commercial TAROM flight, which is alleged to have brought up to eighty USLA troops from Bucharest to Sibiu on December 20, 1989. It is not clear if the USLA forces were actually on the airplane, or, even if they were, what they actually did in Sibiu…[Serban] Sandulescu (c1996), [pp.] 57-58…suggests they were not members of USLA but the DIA [Army’s Intelligence Unit].[9]
There is, however, far more convincing structural and specific evidence suggesting that these were USLA personnel, rather than DIA. Nicu Silvestru, Chief of the Sibiu County Militia, admitted in passing in 1990 in a letter from prison that Nicolae Ceausescu’s son, Nicu, party head of Sibiu County, announced at a crisis meeting on the afternoon of 19 December 1989 that he was going to “o sa-mi chem specialistii mei de la Bucuresti” to open fire should protests break out in Sibiu.[10] Ceausescu’s Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial in January 1990 that Nicu had called him requesting “ceva trupe” and Postelnicu testified he informed Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of the request.[11] If they were indeed DIA personnel, why would Nicu have called Postelnicu, and why would Postelnicu have informed Vlad of the request—would such a request not have been relayed through the Defense Minister?
The first two military prosecutors for Sibiu, Anton Socaciu and Marian Valer, identified the passengers as USLA.[12] Even Nicu Ceausescu admits that this was the accusation when he stated in August 1990:
“…au fost doua variante pe care mi le-a dat Procuratura militara. Deci, o data in prima faza a anchetei penale, ca erau cei de la Ministerul de Interne. Dupa aceea, in faza a doua a anchetei penale, cind USLA si cei de la Ministerul de Interne au inceput sa treaca ,in umbra’ ca sa zic asa si nu se mai pomeneste nimic de ei, s-au luat declaratii dupa lista de pasageri din care a reiesit dupa cite, mi-au spus anchetatorii, ca erau oameni normali fara nici o problema.”[13]
The USLA Commander General Gheorghe Ardeleanu is also reported to have, when confronted by Army General Nicolae Militaru on the night of 23/24 December 1989 at the Defense Ministry about the status of USLA personnel, responded that there were “30 in paza la ambasade si 80 la Sibiu plecati cu un Rombac inca din 20 decembrie 1989 ,din ordin superior’.”[14] Army General Ion Hortopan confirmed this account to Serban Sandulescu his hearing before the Gabrielescu Commission, as follows:
Sandulescu: About those dressed in black jumpsuits do you know anything, do you have any information about whom they belonged to?
Hortopan: On the contrary. These were the 80 uslasi sent by the MI [Interior Ministry], by General Vlad and Postelnicu to guard Nicolae Ceausescu [i.e. Nicu]. I make this claim because Colonel Ardelean[u] in front of General Militaru, and he probably told you about this problem, at which I was present when he reported, when General Militaru asked him how many men he had in total and how many were now present, where each of them was: out of which he said that 80 were in Sibiu based on an order from his commanders. Thus, it is natural that these are who they were.[15]
Finally, Army Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir told the Army daily in November 1990:
Dragomir: Lucrurile au inceput sa se precipite la 22 decembrie. Dimineata mi s-a raportat ca elevii aflati in citeva puncta din oras observa indivizi suspecti, in salopete negre, pe acoperisuri si la iluminatoarele podurilor anumitor cladiri.
Reporter: Aceleasi echipament ca al uslasilor ucisi in fata M.ApN.…
Dragomir: Si pe cladirea Militiei se afla trei sau patru asemenea indivizi…[16]
Of course, the fact that these individuals were posted on the top of the Militia building on this morning, speaks volumes in itself about their affiliation. (Would Army personnel, DIA, have been given access to positions on the Militia building by the Militia? This seems unlikely.) Indeed, in a written statement dated 28 January 1990, Ioan Scarlatescu, (Dir. Comm. Jud. Sibiu), admitted that he was asked by the Army on that morning if the unknown individuals “could be from the USLA?”[17]
As one can tell here, whereas the Indictment quotes a single Securitate source to insinuate that those transported on 20 December 1989 to Sibiu were DIA, and Securitate sources in the media must rely almost exclusively on Securitate and Militia accounts and claims, the claim that they were instead USLA relies not just on the accounts of military personnel, but on the words of the actors involved, be they Securitate, Militia, or high ranking regime officials, to include Nicu Ceausescu himself. The latter account—the first account—that these were indeed Securitate USLA personnel is thus the far more credible and likely account.
[1] About Stoenescu’s past, see, for example, http://www.puterea.ro/news13111/EXCLUSIV-Recrutat-inainte-de-Revolutie-sub-numele-conspirativ-%E2%80%9CGavrilescu-Adrian%E2%80%9D-istoricul-Alex-Stoenescu-a-primit-bani-de-la-Securitate.htm
[2] Valentin Raiha, Revoluția Română și Jocul Serviciilor Secrete, (Baia Mare: Euxinus-Impex, 1994), p. 52.
[3] Liviu Man and Eugen Popescu, “Un Colonel din Contrainfortiile Militare Vrea Adevarul: Generalii Guse si Directia de Informatii a Armatei,” NU!, nr. 32 (1990), p. 5.
[4] Costache Codrescu, et. al. (eds.), Armata romana in revolutia din decembrie 1989 (Editura Militara, 1998), fn. 48 p. 146.
[5] Serban Sandulescu, Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana (Bucharest: Omega, 1996), pp. 211-212
[6] Serban Sandulescu, Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana (Bucharest: Omega, 1996), pp. 211-212
[7] Serban Sandulescu, Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revolutia Romana (Bucharest: Omega, 1996), p. 214. Sandulescu’s book was marketed and printed by Sorin Rosca Stanescu’s Ziua press. Rosca Stanescu was a former USLA informer between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. Who was Sandulescu’s chief counselor on these matters? Stefan Radoi, a former USLA officer in the early 1980s! These are the type of people who, of course, believe the passengers were DIA and not USLA! See the discussion of this whole fiasco in Richard Andrew Hall, “The Securitate Roots of a Modern Romanian Fairy Tale,” RFE “East European Perspectives” vol. 4, nr. 7-9, April-May 2002, at https://www.rferl.org/a/1342502.html; https://www.rferl.org/a/1342503.html; https://www.rferl.org/a/1342506.html .
[8] See Dinu’s testimony in Sandulescu, Lovitura de Stat, p. 220. Also see the description of transport during these days by a senior UM 404 officer, Col. Remus Ghergulescu in Jurnalul National, 4 martie 2004, at https://jurnalul.antena3.ro/campaniile-jurnalul/decembrie-89/revolta-de-la-timisoara-a-venit-pe-filiera-iugoslava-71956.html .
[9] Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 152, fn. nr. 32.
[10] Nicu Silvestru, “Cine a ordonat sa se traga la Sibiu?” Baricada, no. 45, 1990, p.5.
[11] Emil Munteanu, “Postelnicu a vorbit neintrebat,” Romania Libera, 30 ianuarie 1990, p. 1.
[12] See, for example, Marian Valer, cu Monica N Marginean, “MARIAN VALER: Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei”Expres, nr. 33 (septembrie 1990), p. 2.
[13] Interview with Nicu Ceausescu, “Nicu Ceausescu se destainuie,”Zig-Zag, nr. 20, 21-27 august 1990.
[14] Lt. Col. Mihai Floca and a group of Army officers, “Eroi, victime sau teroristi?” “Adevarul,” 29 august 1990. See also, Dan Badea, “Cine au fost teroristii?” Expres nr. 41 (15-21 octombrie1991) p. 10.
[15] “Virgil Magureanu sustine ca revolta din 1989 a fost sprijinita din interiorul sistemului,” Gardianul, 12 noiembrie 2005, online edition.
[16] Lt. Col. Aurel Dragomir, interview by Colonel Dragos Dragoi, “Sub tirul incrucisat al acuzatiilor (II),” Armata Poporului, no. 46 (noiembrie 1990), p. 3. Remus Ghergulescu specified USLA appearance as follows: “Peste combinezoanele negre in care erau imbracati aveau mantale kaki. Normal. Combinezoanele erau in dotarea lor pentru “tinuta de lupta”, iar mantalele, pentru “tinuta de oras”.” (Colonel Remus Ghergulescu, cu Razvan Belciuganu, “Teroristii au iesit din haos,” Jurnalul National, 29 noiembrie 2004, at https://jurnalul.antena3.ro/special-jurnalul/teroristii-au-iesit-din-haos-55843.html .)
[17] See Evenimentul Zilei, 25 noiembrie 1992, p. 3.
Roland O. Thomasson, PHD 