A month has passed since my colleague Andrei Ursu wrote an open letter and appeal…
Sadly, but predictably, it has been all but ignored by the Romanian media and intellectuals. Is that because it is unworthy of attention? Of course not. It is because it does not fit with the prevailing, but false narrative that has been favored for so long, particularly by those intellectuals.
Andrei also attached a handwritten message of retired Securitate (DIE, foreign intelligence directorate) Colonel Domitian Baltei dated 25 December 1989 and directed to Securitate General Iulian Vlad and Army General Stefan Guse, with the heading “F(oarte) Urgent,” or in other words Very Urgent. Here I will unpack the significance of this letter. Keep in mind here, this yet again is another devastating blow to the military prosecutors involved in the Revolution File, because this document comes directly from the Revolution File. They included it in there, although one wonders if they ever read it or how well they read it, or if they did anything to follow up on the details given by Baltei. (Below a rough first cut at translating the content.)
TVR vol. 95 pp. 310-312
Page 1 (of 3)
Here, on page 1, Baltei talks about the “grupuri de rezistenti” in the area around the TVR television station (Calea Dorobanti-Televiziune). To begin with, his use of the term “rezistenti” from “rezistenta” is critical. While others were referring to those who were firing on those supporting the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu as “loyalists,” “counterrevolutionaries,” “Securitate loyal to Ceausescu,” or “(Securitate) terrorists,” Baltei calls them resisters. That is critical because as we have discussed in our book–Trăgători și mistificatori. Contrarevoluția Securității în decembrie 1989 (Polirom, 2019)–those firing were not doing something ad hoc and unplanned, but were following a plan, specifically the long planned “lupta de rezistenta” of “resistance war.” As a retired Securitate officer, Baltei was signalling already his background knowledge and prior/current access to classified information.
In pt. 1, Baltei, says that as a group they operate in “small numbers” from the Securitate safehouses and the houses of Securitate collaborators (so much for those, see previous posts for example, on Braila, who sought to suggest to us otherwise…)
In pt. 2, Baltei says that beginning on Sunday morning the 24th, individuals of this group were one by one withdrawing to a different zone, towards the Securitate’s surveillance center near to the vila of the “former dictator” (i.e. Nicolae Ceausescu) and to a vila used by his daughter Zoia. (so as one can see everything here is linked to the Securitate and to the Ceausescus). Later, when it is turning dark, the resisters return to the area around the Television Station (Piata Dorobantilor-Piata Aviatorilor).
Baltei advises that therefore, during the day, it would be possible to verify/inspect the first and second line dwellings in this area, and to send soldiers and members of the Patriotic Guards to occupy these places, while securing the third line of dwellings. He then goes on to suggest the need to surround the surveillance center of the Securitate in the area.
On page 2 (of 3)
In pt. 3, Baltei talks about what the “grupurile de rezistenti” do at nighttime, saying they use a system of communication and direction of their operations, involving signal lanterns. The command centers of the operations in the area are then detailed including a Securitate bloc.
In pt. 4, Baltei talks about a bloc in which there are amassed a large force, who had been placed there for a long time and belonging to the Securitate units responsible for the security and guarding of the dictator (i.e. Directia a V-a) and the surveillance of the area.
In pt. 5, Baltei says the “grupuri de rezistenti” also have at their disposal a center for surveilling telephone calls in the area (and possibly in the rest of the capital he surmises). He then says that phone calls the resistance groups don’t like are blocked, and recounts how earlier he tried to call the Defense Ministry to give the details outlined in this letter, but his phone was blocked and was permanently out of service thereafter.
In pt. 6, Baltei notes that the leadership of the resistance groups have also called into action reserve officers of the Fifth Directorate.
In pt. 7, Baltei notes that presumably, at the moment he was writing, that there were still scattered resistance fighters firing from Securitate safehouses, although the gunfire was reduced from earlier (note–it is unclear if this was after the announcement and broadcast of the video showing the execution of the Ceausescus or just the usual fall off at certain times of day).
In pt. 8, Baltei talks about the intensification of resistance activities in the Drumul Taberei region and elsewhere on the night of Sunday into Monday (24th/25th), with these groups attempting to reach the Telephone Center and the Defense Ministry, before withdrawing in the morning. He then talks about how this group is also using “semnale luminoase” to communicate with one another and specifies the tall blocs from the Complexul Comercial – Str. Tirgu Neamt zone from which they are operating (note–once again, throughout, Baltei makes very specific claims).
On page 3 (of 3)
In pt. 9, Baltei talks about the son of Interior Minister and former head of the Securitate Tudor Postelnicu as being very active from his place of residence, making lots of trips with different individuals.
In pt. 10, Baltei specifies that “from information, that I have been unable to verify” (note therefore contrasting it to the other information) the groups of terrorists (for the first time he uses, interchangeable with the resistance fighters, the term terrorists) have at their disposal in a Securitate bloc on Piata Aviatorilor (near the metro entrance), a large tunnel, that links up with the surveillance center in the area to which he previously referred. There they have an underground deposit of weapons, situated across from the little park next to the bloc. They also have bunkers with arms in the Str. Constantinescu, Str. Radu Beller area.
Baltei closes by saying that he has gathered this information as a result of an observation post he set up with the help of several members of the Patriotic Guards, beginning on the evening of Saturday 24 December (note–assume he means night of 23/24 December). He reports that one of the Patriotic Guards was wounded but not seriously.
Dated and Signed 25 December 1989
Why the Baltei message is important?
Baltei wasn’t just anyone. He was a retired Securitate officer, albeit in the foreign intelligence directorate. He had at least indirect access to plans associated with the “lupta de rezistenta” or to those who had access to them or were even involved in it. What he didn’t know he could surmise in part as having been a member of the organization and likely continuing to keep friends and acquaintances in it. What isn’t clear here is Baltei’s motivation. Was he attempting to save his own skin by providing information on his former colleagues, to use this as a bargaining chip in the new world of a new post-Ceausescu regime? Was he giving General Vlad a potential “out” or acknowledging an emerging potential “out” by seeking to pin things on Tudor Postelnicu via Postelnicu’s son? No doubt there are those who will read this, and in their seemingly bottomless denial, suggest that because the previous two suppositions were true, or because he was a former Securitate officer, Baltei was just inventing things and lying. No, he may or may not have been leaking about his former colleagues, but it is abundantly clear from the detail above (how it matches the details given by others involved in the fighting in that area), from the differentiation between what he claimed to observe and what he could not verify personally, from its almost matter of fact rather than hyperbolic tone, that Baltei knew more and could see and observe more than the average citizen, precisely because he worked for the organization responsible for the pro-Ceausescu Securitate terrorism carried out by these “grupuri de rezistenti.”
One must ask then? If this exists in the files of the Revolution, how many other things, notes, depositions, etc. must exist that discredit the ridiculous Rechizitoriu of April 2019 and that actually reveal the Securitate’s responsibility for the bulk of the post-22 December mayhem and bloodshed? Could there be more to come?
Perhaps, indeed, finally, however incrementally…the PAST IS COMING!
Roland O. Thomasson, PHD 
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