For now I will merely post this. My colleague and co-author Andrei Ursu included a link and excerpts from this previously unpublished original document in the following: http://gh-ursu.ong.ro/ApelCreareServiciuParchet.pdf . What this Strict Secret – marked “Synopsis of problems regarding the means of discovering and capturing the terrorists who remain at large” tells us is in keeping with the details of previously unpublished original documents posted on this site: 1) https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2021/12/01/dosarul-revolutiei-the-past-is-coming-1-proces-verbal-30-ianuarie-1990-constantin-oancea-adjunct-m-a-e/ and 2) https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2021/07/05/dosarul-revolutiei-the-25-december-1989-message-of-securitate-die-col-baltei-domitian-that-military-prosecutors-possess-but-have-ignored/ . Significantly, this document shows that what leaders of the National Salvation Front were saying publicly about the existence and institutional affiliation of the terrorists at the time, is matched by what they were writing privately. This 7 page typed document was signed by Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican Voiculescu on 29 December 1989 (page seven) and Prime Minister Petre Roman on 30 December 1989 (page one, top right). In recent years in particular, but for a long time overall, Voican and Roman have publicly denied exactly what is detailed in this document. In fact, both have gone so far as to allege that the Romanian Army invented the myth of counterrevolutionary Securitate terrorists fighting to save Nicolae Ceausescu in order to cover up their own responsibility for bloodily repressing demonstrators before 22 December 1989. This document shows that both Voican and Roman knew better back then, and that they have suffered remarkable opportunistic amnesia as time has gone by. Nor should it be a surprise, especially when one considers that Voican set up the first post-Ceausescu security arm, so called “doi si un sfert” MI unit 0215, by enlisting large numbers of former Securitate officers from the Fourth Directorate, the so-called CI-stii or military counter-intelligence officers. And not surprisingly, CI officers were involved in the Securitate’s failed counterrevolution after 22 December. In saving those officers and legitimizing them, so too he succeeded in assimilating and enabling their disinformation and revisionism on December 1989. Hence, his “amnesia” was situational and dictated by the politics of political competition and the fight for power in 1990. The same likely applies to the behavior of his boss, Petre Roman. This original document is a powerful corrective to their amnesia and in fact to the amnesia of the broader Romanian media, intelligentsia, and society about what really happened in December 1989.
CC vol. 112, pp. 72-78
Roland O. Thomasson, PHD 