I post here together a compendium of the documents which have been declassified on the 30th Anniversary of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989.  The Americans, the British, the Canadians, the Soviets, and the Hungarians from documents from the time are clear:  the “terrorists” existed, they were in the main from the Securitate, and they were fighting on behalf of the fallen tyrant, Nicolae Ceausescu.  The question now is:  how many Romanians will be able to accept this fact?  Pleasant reading!

ROMANIA:  CIA National Intelligence Daily 28 December 1989 (declassified from Top Secret and Released to the public on 10 December 2019, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/633/cia-reports-on-the-collapse-of-communism-in-europe/5)

Romania:  New Regime Consolidating Security

The government continues to make limited progress in eliminating the threat from Securitate diehards, but Romanians are increasingly skeptical of Communist dominance of the new government.

On Tuesday [26 December 1989], the new government put internal security forces and border guards under the Defense Ministry and set a new deadline for the Securitate troops to surrender.  The government is also calling on civilians to turn in all arms issued to defeat Nicolae Ceausescu.  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Information not declassified for protection of sources and methods xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx nearly half of an estimated 200 Securitate members in Timisoara were dead, captured, or had escaped.  xxxx Classification not declassified xxxx

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What can we learn from this?  For one thing, there is nothing here, absolutely nothing, to substantiate the claims of the military prosecutors in the Indictment of April 2019 in the so-called Dosarul Revolutiei, according to which Ion Iliescu, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, Iosif Rus, Nicolae Militaru and other military commanders are accused of having “invented” a terrorist diversion with non-existent terrorists in order to seize and legitimate their power, especially by intentionally disseminating disinformation through television.  Nor is there anything here about Generals Stanculescu, Guse, and others with blood on their hands for their role in repressing demonstrators in Timisoara giving contradictory orders and “inventing” terrorists in order to create a heroic image for the military and buy themselves immunity for their actions in Timisoara.  Nor is there anything here about everything just being about confusion, and suspicion, and mass psychosis, and accidental “friendly fire” being the dominant condition.  Nor is there anything here about the Army’s DIA (Buzau 404) or “Soviet tourists” (KGB, GRU, Spetnaz), etc. or others as being the actual terrorists engaged in a false flag operation to incriminate the Securitate.  Nor as a journalist in Romania suggested was the use of the term “Securitate diehards” inspired by the 1988 Bruce Willis film “Diehard” or was CIA “prisoners of information supplied by the [National Salvation] Front https://evenimentulistoric.ro/cia-prizonierii-informatiilor-venite-de-la-fsn-documente-inedite.html …that is why two lines are excised in the section above, precisely because of the highly sensitive level of how the information was acquired.  Finally, it should be clear, especially if one reads the entire document, that the analyst[s] who wrote this crisis piece, had no illusions about Iliescu and the Front (they saw that they were high level former communists who were already being decried by people in the streets) or that ‘free flowing arms’–arms distributed or seized by the population during the events–were a fact.  But these were facts, alongside the fact that there were Securitate terrorists fighting on behalf of Ceausescu, something which they knew from sources other than just international media or “The Front.”

Significantly, the CIA NID from 28 December 1989 is consistent with what National Security Council (NSC) Director for European Affairs Robert Hutchings maintained in 1997: “It was an argument that had a few adherents at staff level during those chaotic days, during which a successful counterrevolution by Ceausescu loyalists seemed a real danger…110. …With Moscow as with others [“Bonn, London, Paris, and other capitals”], there was a broadly shared desire to see Ceausescu loyalists defeated, the bloodshed ended, and the democratic ‘spirit of Timisoara’ vindicated.” https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/robert-hutchings-nsc-director-for-europe-89-92-on-romania-december-1989/

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The second and third documents here are courtesy of the efforts of the Canadian journalist, Stanley Tromp (the US documents referred to are from the Department of State):

Records on the Romanian Revolution of 1989

Obtained by journalist Stanley Tromp, through the

Freedom of Information (FOI) laws of Great Britain, the United States

and Canada – 2019 http://www3.telus.net/index100/romania?fbclid=IwAR0UOkJ7l-5y7RXqkWgtfboSmeg0WcriTLqySUW-ajwqr5LOs-Z8e7XopWw

stanleytromp@gmail.com

The below is from File 5 of Records from British Foreign Office – 109 pages, page 27, from pages 26-28, a cable from Bucharest on the chronology of the Revolution, date 2 January 1990.

SATURDAY 23 DECEMBER

SECURITATE ATTACK RTV [TVR] STATION DURING NIGHT.  RESIDENCE OCCUPIED BY SECURITATE AND ATTACKED.  HMA’S [Her Majesty’s Ambassador] FAMILY ESCAPES.  EMBASSY SHREDDING STARTS.  ATTEMPT TO EVACUATE FURTHER EMBASSY STAFF BY COMMERCIAL FLIGHT FAILS.

Significantly, in File 6 from Canada’s External Affairs Department, on p. 88, from 24 December 1989, the Canadian Embassy in Bucharest also alludes to the “terrorist” attack on the British Residence.)

24 December 1989

4. FIGHTING TODAY WAS FIERCE NOISE, SPORADIC AND WIDESPREAD, REFLECTING TRUE NATURE, TRNG AND COMPETENCE OF ARMED FORCE COMPONENT OF SECURITATE. WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT NON ROMS [non-Romanians] WERE USED BY OR FORM PART OF SECURITATE THEIR BRUTALITY SINCE TIMISOARA WILL LEAVE ITS MARK OVER AND ABOVE EARLIER REPUTATION. TACTICS AND DETAILS OF THESE TERRORISTS AND THEIR OPS ARE NOW WELL BROADCAST AND PHONE CALLERS SUBSTANTIATE THE WORST.

2….OUR CDNS [CANADIANS] LEFT CHANCERY IN SEMI-DARKNESS WITH LOUD ACCOMPANIAMENT [sic.] OF AUTOMATIC AND SMALL ARMS FIRE NEARBY.  THEY SHOULD BE IN PLENTY [of] TIME TO ATTEND MIDNIGHT SERVICE AT NEVSKY CATHEDRAL IN SOFIA AND LUCKIER THAN SAY BRIT CONTINGENT WHO WERE RETICENCT TO MOVE UNTIL RESULT OF AMER [AMERICAN] EFFORT.  THEIR CONCERN BASED PROBABLY ON MORE EXPOSED POSN [POSITION] AND BLOW OF HAVING AMBS [AMBASSADOR’S] RESIDENCE BURNED TO GROUND BY TERRORISTS.

If one puts these cables side by side with what has appeared in media and on the Internet in the past several decades, there is little doubt that there is no confusion here…British Embassy Staff did not mistake soldiers, or Interior Ministry personnel fighting on the side of the Revolution, or panicked, untrained armed civilians, for those who seized the ambassador’s residence.  It was clear, they were Securitate terrorists.

See, for example, such details here:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/resedinta-ambasadorului-britanic-tvr-si-teroristii-updated-w-british-foreign-office-records/

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Also, related to confirmation of information about December 1989, from December 2019:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/former-hungarian-pm-miklos-nemeth-confirms-hungarian-role-in-locating-securitate-transmitters-in-december-1989-december-2019-magyar-hang/

From the declassified documents obtained by Canadian journalist, Stanley Tromp:  http://www3.telus.net/index100/records2

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov’s comments on 24 December 1989 to the US Ambassador to Moscow regarding renunciation of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” have previously been reported (sometimes using different phraseology, but with the same general content) in other fora:  see, for example, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin10_p5.pdf ), but here one can see the original exchange:

“In response to the Ambassador’s direct question, Aboimov once again strongly reiterated the Soviet Union’s determination not to intervene militarily in Romania’s internal affairs, noting in a clear reference to Panama that ‘We have given the Brezhnev Doctrine to you, with our compliments.'”

What has not been reported previously are Aboimov’s comments with regard to who was the cause behind the continuing bloodshed in Bucharest and the rest of Romania:

“5. With regard to the Soviet Trade Mission personnel [two of whom had allegedly been wounded per paragraph 2], Aboimov said that the apartment building where many of the Mission’s personnel lived had been the scene of serious fighting yesterday.  “Terrorists” (by which Aboimov clearly indicated he meant Securitate) had actually been in the building at one time.  There was heavy shooting and the building itself was on set on fire.  The shooting continued until midday, when the Soviet Embassy managed to evacuate Trade Mission personnel and their dependents from the building to Embassy grounds.  Two persons were lightly wounded.” [For a similar incident, suffered by British personnel, see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/resedinta-ambasadorului-britanic-tvr-si-teroristii-updated-w-british-foreign-office-records/ )

“6.  Aboimov said the security situation around the Soviet Embassy itself was not good.  Serious firefight had erupted for one or two hours yesterday near the Embassy when a “nest of terrorists” was wiped out by Government forces…”

From the declassified documents obtained by Canadian journalist, Stanley Tromp:  http://www3.telus.net/index100/records2

from 26 December 1989, US Embassy Bucharest

Another explanation is that the immediate execution might help to take the wind out of the sails of the remaining groups of Securitate terrorizing the country, but we suspect that most of these are now fighting for sheer survival, rather than loyalty to Ceausescu.

[Note here:  the issue/the question is not who was shooting, but why the Securitate were terrorizing the country.  The fact that the identity of the terrorists was not in doubt by Embassy Bucharest personnel is significant and telling.]

…This will not, of course, solve the current terrorist problems posted by the renegade “Unitati Speciale de Lupta Anti-terrorista [sic.]” (USLA), the well trained “anti-terrorist” units which continue to maraud about brazenly.

[It is unclear here if the reference is to USLA from the Securitate who did not join the Revolution, or of elements of the USLA, who did not join the Revolution…but what is clear is that the Securitate, and elements of USLA, were considered responsible for the bloodshed.]

From the declassified documents obtained by Canadian journalist, Stanley Tromp:  http://www3.telus.net/index100/records2

11 January 1990 Moscow

…The Soviets believe the new Romanian Government, hoping to maintain economic ties with the Arab world, is downplaying evidence that “Arab terrorists” fought alongside Securitate forces.  [NOTE:  So well over two and half weeks after the Ceausescus were executed, the Soviets did not question the existence of Securitate forces fighting in December 1989.  That was an accepted fact.  The discussion refers to the Middle Eastern mercenaries who fought ALONSIDE the Securitate forces.]

5. On January 10, Poloff (Political Officer) met with Vladimir Lapshin, Chief of the Romanian in Department in the MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Socialist Countries of Europe Administration, for a readout on the (Soviet Foreign Minister) Shevardnadze visit to Bucharest.  Lapshin, who served in Romania from 1973 to 1979, participated in all of the Bucharest meetings.

ARAB TERRORISTS

7. Noting Romania’s need to develop trading ties with various countries, Lapshin suggested that the new government was attempting to “quiet down” evidence that Arab “Terrorist Squads” participated in the December fighting on the side of the Securitate.  He implied that the Soviets believed such squards existed.  In Lapshin’s view, the new government was anxious not to offend any of the Arab states with whom it wanted to maintain or develop economic ties. [NOTE:  If Lapshin wanted to discredit the new government completely, he could have said that the “Arab terrorists” were a myth and did not exist, that the Front had invented them to legitimize their seizure of power; if he was looking to express complete support for the Front, he would not have raised the possibility, as he did here, that they were lying now about the existence of the Arab terrorists for post facto political purposes.  No, the issue is that the new Romanian government, for “reasons of state,” actually more than just economic reasons as Lapshin speculates, but also for reasons of the security of Romanian citizens working in the Arab states in question–most notably, Libya–was acceding to, and cooperating in the former Securitate’s cover-up, to eliminate evidence and memory of the foreign contingent, who, along with a part of the Securitate, had fought on the losing side of the Revolution, in defense of Nicolae Ceausescu.]

For evidence, confirming Lapshin’s suspicion, see for example:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2015/01/04/25-for-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-romanian-revolution-25-after-the-ceausescus-were-executed-the-counter-revolution-is-disappeared-26-december-1989-24-january-1990/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/grosescu-and-ursachi-the-romanian-revolution-in-court-i-annotated/

https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/02/16/cornel-mihalache-si-sursele-lui-amnistia-are-calibrul-762-mm-1998-valentin-raiha-mihai-ungheanu-pavel-corut-anul-nou-se-naste-in-sange-ministerul-de-interne-1998-si-cornel-ivanciuc/?fbclid=IwAR1dM7Kovn3gg0L2lKkIEfsmbertc74_JWa3gF–vsDfylFcC8fNp3hLQ5Q

Another Mihalache classic, brought to you by the former Securitate, is “Revolutia va apartine sau Cantarea Revolutiei,” from 2010:

Who are Mihalache’s three sources for much of the film:

1) Doru Viorel Ursu:  the usual…Facultate de Drept, procuror…and from 16 June 1990 to 26 September 1991, Interior Minister!…what are the odds he might have former Securitate ties?

Doru-Viorel Ursu s-a născut la Drobeta-Turnu Severin, pe 1 martie 1953. În anul 1976 a terminat Facultatea de Drept din București, cu nota 9,95. A devenit procuror la Procuratura Sectorului 2. În anul 1980 devine judecător la Tribunalul Militar București iar în 1989 devine președintele Tribunalului Militar. Mai 1990 primește dosarul lui Nicu Ceaușescu. Pe 14 iunie 1990 devine ministru de Interne în Guvernul Petre Roman, până în 16 octombrie 1991, apoi este secretar de stat la Ministerul de Externe. 1992 devine deputat de Argeș, al Partidului Democrat. Își incepe cariera in avocatură. Până în 1996 este membru al Comisiei de Control a SRI. 1997 își dă doctoratul în Drept Penal și ajunge până la gradul de conferențiar universitar. Renunță la politică și la profesorat pentru avocatură. În prezent este avocat titular al Cabinetului de avocat “Doru Viorel Ursu” cu sediul în București.

2) Ion Cristoiu, aka “Coroiu,” his Securitate source name… Madalin Hodor can tell you much more about this.

And of course, Cristoiu is a big supporter of Rechizitoriul din Dosarul Revolutiei!

https://evz.ro/de-la-teroristul-din-decembrie-1989-la-chinezul-din-februarie-2020.html

3) Alex Mihai Stoenscu, istoric (historian)…yes indeed alright, he’s a historian…a historian who propagates the Securitate’s revisionist narrative on December 1989…and guess what?  He too happens to have been paid informer of the Securitate!

http://www.ziare.com/stiri/securitate/istoricul-alex-mihai-stoenescu-a-fost-colaborator-al-securitatii-1291458

So, all three of Mihalache’s main sources for this film…have links to the former Securitate!

Filmmaker Cornel Mihalache (“Decembrie Rosu”) is incredulous that anyone could accuse him of promoting the narrative of the former Securitate.  Wherever could such a belief come from?  Let us look at some of his films, to answer that question.  The following apparently premiered on TVR1 in the program “In Flagrant” on 22 December 1998.

Mihalache quotes as if stating fact, from the volume published by the Interior Ministry (!) in 1998 entitled “Anul nou se naste in sange.”

These are from the interval of approximately 7:25 – 9:08.  During this interval, Mihalache talks about the research “confirming” the Directorate of Information of the Army’s Marele Stat Major (DIA/M.St.M.) as being responsible for so-called diversion which claimed so many lives after 22 December 1989.  Mihalache seems not to know that this theory originated in 1990 among the former Securitate.  He cites at approximately 8:30 the following as his sources for this claim:

1) Valentin Raiha

2) Ilie Stoian

3) Mihai Ungheanu

4) Pavel Corut

5) “Anul nou se naste in sange” (Ministerul de Interne, 1998)

6) Cornel Ivanciuc

Of these, six sources, one is part institutional successor to the Securitate and Militie, the Interior Ministry.  Two of them, he doesn’t mention this, Raiha and Corut, are former officers of the Securitate’s Directorate IV (Military Counter-intelligence, CI-stii).  Ungheanu was a well-known “protocronist,” part of the group that served as the ideological backbone of the national-communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, who in the post-communist era would be elected to parliament as a member of court poet Corneliu Vadim Tudor’s PRM.  Ivanciuc would become a famous case years later as someone who was found to have been a Securitate collaborator.  Only Stoian has no obvious tie that we know of to the Securitate and the former Ceausescu regime.

How is it, or rather why is it, that Cornel Mihalache could present the conclusion of people with clear ties to the former Securitate as the “truth” without any mention that their past affiliation might influence their writings on December 1989?

When I heard that filmmaker Cornel Mihalache (“Decembrie Rosu” etc.) had invoked Gelu Voican Voiculescu about the “Soviet tourists” in December 1989 during his combined ambush with Razvan Butnaru of my co-authors (Andrei Ursu, Madalin Hodor) at the launch of our book, I was initially in disbelief.  First of all, what an incredibly weak argument.  Second of all, although I am all-too-familiar with this tall tale, I was unsure about the specific Voican reference.  So, I, unlike some people, did a little internet research, and found what I think was the source of Voican’s recent comment.  Lo’ and Behold, I found it, where else?, but on Grigore Cartianu’s site.  I repost below his article and the comments it spawned, before highlighting the absurdity of this claim.

https://ziaristii.com/l-prins-cu-minciuna-gelu-voican-voiculescu-incercat-sa-acopere-pe-cei-60-000-de-turisti-sovietici-din-1989-dar-s-facut-de-ras/

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L-am prins cu încă o minciună grosolană pe monstrul Gelu Voican Voiculescu! Acesta admite – într-o emisiune la Antena 3 – că au fost peste 60.000 de agenți sovietici în România, în decembrie 1989, dar zice că n-au apucat să facă nimic, pentru că a căzut Ceaușescu prea repede. Ce stupid!

Săgeata Moscovei spune că toți cei 60.000 de „militari” sovietici au intrat în România pe 21 decembrie. În realitate, Ceaușescu închisese granițele pe 17 decembrie, deci sovieticii se aflau în România de cel puțin cinci zile!!!

Voican Voiculescu are o teorie nu doar diversionistă, ci și de-a dreptul cretină. Invocă Raportul Comisiei senatoriale (Sergiu Nicolaescu – Valentin Gabrielescu), care „vorbește de prezența a peste 60.000 de militari, intrați în special dinspre Iugoslavia, în Lade roșii”. Aceștia „aparțineau, în principiu, de Spetnaz”, trupe speciale ale GRU (servicul secret al Armatei URSS, în prezent al Rusiei).

Dar, să vezi minune, „nu s-a dovedit vreo acțiune de-a lor; au fost prezenți și așteptau niște instrucțiuni, care n-au mai venit”. De ce? Altă minune: „Pentru că nimeni n-a prevăzut că Ceaușescu va cădea într-o zi! Ceea ce s-a întâmplat în 22 decembrie, apariția noastră… pur și simplu i-au paralizat pe acești oameni… și nimeni n-a mai înțeles nimic ce se întâmplă”.

Această colosală serie de minciuni trebuie neapărat spulberată! Așadar, puhoiul sovietic n-ar fi avut timp să acționeze (să spargă vitrinele magazinelor la Timișoara, să activeze agenții KGB/GRU din România, să împuște oameni, să monteze simulatoare, să creeze diversiuni etc.) pentru că „nimeni n-a prevăzut că Ceaușescu va cădea într-o zi”. Așadar, agenții Moscovei intraseră în țară pe 21, iar Ceaușescu a căzut pe 22. Asta ne spune Voican.

Numai că, ghinion: granițele României au fost închise timp de cinci zile, din 17 în 22 decembrie! Le-a închis Ceaușescu pe 17, le-a deschis Iliescu pe 22. Așadar, la căderea dictatorului român, sovieticii se aflau de cel puțin cinci zile în România. Evident, ei n-au intrat în țara noastră într-o singură zi. Ceaușescu a fost exasperat pentru că, potrivit informațiilor primite de la Securitate (generalul Iulian Vlad îi raporta personal), invazia sovietică începuse de câteva săptămâni (după Congresul al XIV-lea al PCR, 20-24 noiembrie 1989) și se accelerase din 7 decembrie (imediat după ultima întâlnire importantă sub acest aspect, cea dintre Mihail Gorbaciov și François Mitterand, pe 6 decembrie, la Kiev).

Așadar, o parte dintre „turiștii” sovietici – sau „militari”, cum le spune Voican – se aflau în România de multe zile, unii chiar de două-trei săptămâni! Au avut timp suficient să pună în aplicare planul Moscovei de a-l răsturna pe Ceaușescu și, ulterior, de a impune la putere echipa pro-sovietică Iliescu – Brucan – Roman – Militaru – Voican Voiculescu.

VIDEO: Pasajul relevant începe la minutul 12:50

Dialogul în care Gelu Voican Voiculescu se dă de gol

Mircea Badea: Generalul Ștefan Dinu (șeful DIA în 1989 – n. red.) vorbea despre niște informări externe cu privire la niște prezențe străine în România, care să genereze panică, teroare, revoltă și așa mai departe.

Gelu Voican Voiculescu: Eu m-am întreținut de două ori cu generalul Dinu, când a fost la niște conferințe ale noastre la Institutul Revoluției. Dar ceea ce vă pot spune, și este public: Raportul lui Sergiu Nicolaescu și Raportul lui Valentin Gabrielescu (cu Sergiu Nicolaescu vicepreședinte) vorbește de prezența a peste 60.000 de militari, intrați în special dinspre Iugoslavia, în Lade roșii.

Mircea Badea: Vă dați seama… totuși, 60.000… e un stadion! E un stadion de oameni!

Gelu Voican Voiculescu: Acestea sunt cifrele Raportului. Și… acești oameni aparțineau, în principiu, de Spetnaz.

Mircea Badea: Bun, ăștia ar fi ruși…

Gelu Voican Voiculescu: Da, dar nu s-a dovedit vreo acțiune de-a lor. Au fost prezenți și așteptau niște instrucțiuni, care n-au mai venit. De ce? Pentru că…

Mihai Gâdea: Adică au venit 60.000 de oameni și n-au mai făcut nimic?

Gelu Voican Voiculescu: N-au apucat să facă, pentru că nimeni n-a prevăzut că Ceaușescu va cădea într-o zi! Ceea ce s-a întâmplat în 22 decembrie, apariția noastră… pur și simplu i-au paralizat pe acești oameni… și nimeni n-a mai înțeles nimic ce se întâmplă.

Mihai Gâdea: Chiar credeți că asta? Chiar credeți că au venit 60.000 de oameni și n-au mai făcut nimic?

Gelu Voican Voiculescu: N-au mai făcut nimic, iar o parte din ei au fost retrași în octombrie ’90 la intervenția lui Petre Roman, dar erau vreo 20.000 – 30.000 doar. Rămăseseră de-atuncea.

Mircea Badea: Și unde-au stat? Ce-au făcut? Ce-au mâncat? Cum au viețuit, totuși?

Gelu Voican Voiculescu: Nu se știe. Dar generalul Caraman, care era la SIE, l-a informat pe Petre Roman, iar Petre Roman a luat legătura cu autoritățile sovietice și au fost retrași. Și pot să vă spun că s-au îmbarcat în Gara Triaj, în mai multe garnituri de trenuri. Astea sunt realitățile pe care le cunosc.

Mihai Gâdea: Publicitate!

(Yeah, indeed, I would cut to commercial pretty quick too.)

Now, I am not a military historian, but a brief search of the internet, appears to suggest the average Soviet division size was 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers…which would mean, that with upheaval in the Baltics, protests in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian-Azerbaijani tensions, miners strikes in Ukraine, and a nationalist wave in Soviet Moldova in 1989, despite all that…to say nothing of the ongoing Cold War with the United States, and the fact that the Soviets left Honecker and Mielke–the GDR being by far the most important of the Warsaw Pact countries–out to dry two months earlier and refused to support a crackdown against East German protesters…no, despite all that, apparently according to this ridiculous narrative…the Soviets had the equivalent of at least FIVE DIVISIONS of undercover military personnel in Romania in December 1989.

But yes, this is the “debate” in Romania, thirty years after the Revolution of December 1989.  Grigore Cartianu thinks that he has caught Voican in a “lie” because Voican says that the FIVE DIVISIONS of Soviet military personnel undercover as tourists in Romania at the time, awaited an order that never came and didn’t end up doing anything.  By contrast, Cartianu maintains well, hell, the FIVE DIVISIONS of Soviet military personnel had been in the country since before the 17th–how the hell else could the Timisoara uprising have broken out–and, of course, they were active after the fall of Ceausescu on 22 December.

In the comments section, Grigore Cartianu accuses my coauthor as follows:

Am vazut aseara, la B1, o emisiune foarte buna despre adevarurile revolutiei, moderata de Silviu Manastire.
Printre participantii de foarte buna calitate a fost scriitorul Andrei Ursu, fiul disidentului Gheorghe Ursu, dar si dubiosul profesor Niculescu, care parea ca are o influenta ciudata asupra lui A Ursu.
E adevarat ca ambii (Ursu si Niculescu) sustineau vinovatia securitatii, dar excludeau cu desavarsire amestecul rusilor in revolutie.
Atunci cand unul dintre invitati pomenea despre rusi, sareau si il contraziceau, iar cand invitatii nu le-au mai permis sa fie intrerupti, faceau grimase, Ursu avea tresariri, de parca il intepa un junghi in ureche.
Macar Voiculescu a recunoscut partial…

Răspundeți

La capitolul Decembrie 1989, Andrei Ursu se comportă ca un veritabil agent de influență al rușilor. Păcat! Ori nu s-a documentat, ori face alte jocuri. Pur și simplu, dă impresia că vrea să-i acopere pe criminalii de după 22 decembrie – o evidentă agentură sovietică, din care făceau parte mulți români (nucleul CFSN)

No, Mr. Cartianu, it is you who has not done sufficient research, and it is you who, knowingly or unknowingly, is sustaining the narrative of the former Securitate.  A brief search of the internet reveals that the “Soviet tourist” scenario has no independent source in the beginning outside of people linked to the former Securitate.  That Securitate Directorate IV (Military counter-intelligence) was at the forefront of this revisionism (think “Paul Cernescu”/Pavel Corut, for example) and that Voican integrated many former CIstii into his newly found UM 0215 in early 1990, may contribute to his weakness for such disinformation.  By the time, the “Soviet tourists” made their entry into the official commissions between 1992 and 1995, they had already been well-seeded among the broader population by the former Securitate and their collaborators.  See below:

Printre primele trei articole din 1990 care au discutat “turistii rusi” sau “turistii sovietici” din decembrie 1989:

1) martie 1990, din partea unui om–Grigore Corpacescu–care se lauda ca “am mulţi prieteni în poliţie.”

2) iunie 1990, din partea lui Sorin Rosca Stanescu (fost informator pentru USLA)

3) septembrie 1990, din partea fostilor ofiteri din Directia V-a a Securitatii.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.wordpress.com/2009/11/27/the-1989-romanian-revolution-as-geopolitical-parlor-game-brandstatter%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccheckmate%E2%80%9D-documentary-and-the-latest-wave-in-a-sea-of-revisionism-part-iii/

traducere de catre Marius Mioc http://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2009/10/01/rich-hall-brandstatter-10/#more-4435

O enigmă securistă: “Turiştii” sovietici şi răsturnarea regimului Ceauşescu

Deşi am scris destul de mult în trecut despre enigma “turiştilor” (vezi, de pildă, Hall, R. A., 2002, “The Securitate Roots of a Modern Romanian Fairy Tale: The Press, the Former Securitate, and the Historiography of December 1989” [Rădăcinile securiste ale unui basm românesc modern: presa, fosta securitate şi istoriografia lui decembrie 1989], “Part 2: Tourists are Terrorists and Terrorists are Tourists with Guns” [Partea a 2-a: Turiştii sînt terorişti şi teroriştii sînt turişti înarmaţi], Radio Free Europe “East European Perspectives” [“Perspective est-europene”, radio Europa Liberă], Vol. 4, nr. 8), nu am discutat în mod formal rolul poveştilor străine despre răsturnarea lui Ceauşescu în istoriografia lui decembrie 1989, în particular legat de această problemă. În urma difuzării documentarului “Şah-mat” a lui Brandstatter în februarie 2004, invocarea de către Vladimir Bukovski a unui articol din 1994 a ziaristului John Simpson pe această problemă sugerează totuşi că e nevoie de o analiză mai amănunţită. Mai mult, după cum arată retrospectiva care a durat un an de zile din “Jurnalul Naţional” despre evenimentele din decembrie 1989, problema “turiştilor”, oarecum surprinzător pentru mine, a devenit centrală în dezbaterile despre revoluţie, astfel amplificîndu-se confuzia asupra evenimentelor din presa şi publicul din România. Desigur, conform tradiţiei, turiştii sovietici/ruşi au făcut figură proeminentă şi, într-un grad mai mic, turiştii unguri. Totuşi, şi stocul altor grupuri de turişti a crescut. De pildă, a fost mai puternic subliniat rolul turiştilor iugoslavi (mai exact, sîrbi) şi, apărînd parcă din senin, cel al turiştilor est germani/STASI! Principalele surse pentru aceste afirmaţii sînt, ca de obicei, foştii ofiţeri de securitate şi miliţie, cu niţel personal din serviciile de informaţii ale armatei aruncat în ciorbă pentru o bună măsură.

Forum străin, context românesc

Este greu de indicat cu exactitate prima menţiune a “turiştilor” şi a pretinsului lor rol în revoluţie, dar se pare că deşi sursa afirmaţiei era românească, publicaţia a fost străină. James F. Burke, al cărui nume este din nefericire neglijat de binecunoscutul şi consultatul document de pe internet “The December 1989 Revolt and the Romanian Coup d’Etat”, face o aluzie la “producătorul de film român” care a făcut pentru prima oară aceste afirmaţii (Burke, J. F., 1994, “The December 1989 Revolt and the Romanian Coup d‘etat”, la http://www.timisoara.com/timisoara/coup.html [lincul respectiv nu mai funcţionează; funcţiona în momentul în care domnul Hall şi-a publicat prima oară lucrarea]). Susţinerile apar într-un articol a lui Richard Bassett în “The Times” (Londra) din 2 martie 1990: “Domnul [Grigore] Corpăcescu nu are îndoieli că revoluţia a fost pusă în scenă cu grijă de ruşi – cum a fost cazul şi în Praga sau Berlinul de Est. Conform domnului Corpăcescu un grup de “turişti” sovietici, cu vize individuale, au ajuns în Timişoara cu două zile înaintea primei demonstraţii din faţa casei pastorului Tokes. Evidenţele poliţiei îi arată ajungînd la Bucureşti în 20 decembrie. În 24, două zile după ce Ceauşescu fugise cu elicopterul, ruşii dispăruseră. Nu există evidenţe ale poliţiei care să arate cum au părăsit ţara”.

Dar domnul Corpăcescu, interlocutorul lui Bassett, mai spune nişte lucruri ciudate. Basset nu este clar, dar se pare că Corpăcescu a sugerat că ministrul de interne postrevoluţionar Mihai Chiţac, care a fost implicat în evenimentele din Timişoara ca şeful trupelor chimice, cumva i-a întărîtat intenţionat pe demonstranţi împotriva regimului deoarece grenadele cu gaze lacrimogene pe care unitatea sa le-a aruncat n-au explodat – lipsa exploziei fiind cumva voită. Dar mai mult decît asta, Corpăcescu, care la vremea articolului filma o reconstituire a zborului lui Ceauşescu din 22 decembrie, folosind acelaşi elicopter şi pilot ca în evenimentul real, a făcut următoarea afirmaţie ciudată:

“Pilotul acestui elicopter îmi este un vechi prieten. Am mulţi prieteni în poliţie, Timişoara nu a început cu preotul ungur Laszlo Tokes [adică a fost cu grijă pusă în scenă de ruşi]“. (“The Times” (Londra), 2 martie 1990).

Pilotul elicopterului era Vasile Maluţan, un ofiţer al Direcţiei a 5-a a Securităţii. Ce fel de persoană ar fi la acea vreme, şi cît de credibilă poate fi o astfel de persoană, care este un vechi prieten cu pilotul şi “are mulţi prieteni în poliţie”? Şi ar fi fost un lucru poate ca două luni după revoluţie să vorbeşti despre prezenţa agenţilor străini “observînd” evenimentele din Timişoara, dar a tăgădui spontaneitatea demonstraţiilor şi a ponegri rolul lui Tokes este foarte suspect. Nu am fost în stare să găsesc informaţii suplimentare despre Corpăcescu, dar revelaţiile sale se întîmplă să îi slujească prietenii foarte bine, în special într-o perioadă în care perspectiva unor trimiteri în judecată şi a unor sentinţe cu puşcăria pentru participarea la represiunea din Timişoara şi din alte părţi în timpul revoluţiei, încă ameninţa mulţi membri ai miliţiei (poliţiei) şi securităţii.

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/29/presa-din-1990-despre-turistii-rusi-din-decembrie-1989/

1) Iulian Vlad (februarie 1991, un articol de catre Mircea Bunea, Adevarul)

2) Gheorghe Roset (martie 1991, revista Europa)

3) Sorin Rosca Stanescu (aprilie 1991, Romania Libera)

4) Radu Balan (iulie 1991, un articol de Radu Ciobotea, revista Flacara)

“Radu Balan ‘isi aminteste’ ca in 18 decembrie la ora 24:00 se indrepta spre IAEM si depasea un grup de zece masini sovietice oprite in 100 de metri de Spitalul Judetean (Rezulta ca in noaptea acea, sub privirile sovieticilor au fost incarcate cadavrele !)”

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/03/14/presa-din-1991-indicatii-pretioase-despre-turistii-rusi-din-decembrie-1989/

So, I have learned, that the documentary filmmaker Cornel Mihalache (“Decembrie Rosu”), who does not believe in Securitate terrorists in December 1989, also believes that the arsenal of the Securitate, including the USLA and Directorate V-a, were dominated by conventional 7,62 mm caliber weapons and that they did not possess or use much else…In fact, in December 1989, on the 24th if I understand correctly, he claims to have been in the building of the Fifth Directorate and found nothing of the sort…

Unfortunately for dl. Mihalache, photos, video, and articles exist that prove he is wrong!

It definitely appears…that dl. Mihalache has not conducted enough research on December 1989.

Holland & Holland (London) kynoch-magnum bullets found in Securitate V-a building

S-a vorbi mult in perioada crimelor din Decembrie ’89 despre gloante speciale cu care erau ucisi tineri si virstnici, gloante care–zice-se nu se aflau in dotarea unitatilor noastre militare. S-a vorbit mult pina s-a tacut si dupa ce s-a facut suficient s-a redeschis discutia de la “nu exista asa ceva!” Gloante speciale n-au existat!–s-au grabit sa spuna mai marii nostri. Dovezi!–cerea Elena Ceausescu intr-o anume situatie. Dovezi!–cere procurorul general M.U.P. Cherecheanu. Dovezi!–se alatura domnul general A. Stanculescu.

Pentru a cauta dovezi este nevoie de putina munca pe care organele in drept nu sint dispuse a o efectua. Se platesc lefuri grase ca sa se taca mai mult decit sa se faca. Bunaoara, la citeva saptamini dupa ce am predat Procuraturii dosarul cu furturile din C.C., procurorul care preluase ancheta de la subsemnatul, intrebat fiind daca a avansat cu ceva, mi-a spus ca nu si ca sa-l sprijin eu ca…Altfel spus, noi scriem–noi rezolvam. Va trebui pina la urma sa cerem adoptarea unei legi prin care sa ni se subordeneze Politia (sau S.R.I.-ul) ca sa-i spunem noi ce si cum sa faca. Pina atunci insa, ne vom limita la dovezi-marturii pe care oamenii le dau, le semneaza si raspund pentru ele.

Consemnam mai jos doua astfel de marturii despre gloante speciale dar si despre altele, marturii ale unor revolutionari din Decembrie ’89…

“UN ASTFEL DE CARTUS AVEA IN VIRF O PITRA ALBA, TRASPARENTA”

BALASA GHEORGHE: Sint foarte intrigat de interviul acordat de dl. general Stanculescu ziarului “Tineretul Liber”, interviu in care acesta ocoleste adevarul.

Din Directia a V-a, din depozitul de munitie, au fost scoase pe 23-24 decembrie 1989 cartuse DUM-DUM, cartuse speciale care nu se potriveau la nici o arma din dotarea M.Ap.N. S-au gasit trei-patru cutii cu astfel de cartuse. Gloantele speciale, erau lungi de 5-6 cm si putin mai groasa decit un creion. Un astfel de cartus avea in virf o piatra alba, transparenta. Toate aceste cartuse i le-am prezentat personal, spre a fi filmate, d-lui Spiru Zeres. Toate cartusele speciale, in afara de DUM-DUM era de provenienta RFG-ista. Din Directia a V-a au fost predate U.M. 01305. Capitan doctor Panait, care a spus ca pina atunci nu vazuse astel de munitie, maior Puiu si captian Visinescu stiu de ele.

In fostul sediu C.C. P.C.R., toti cei impuscati in noaptea de 23 spre 24 decembrie ’89 au fost impuscati cu gloante speciale. Un glont care trece prin zid e absurd sa-l cauti in trupul celui impuscat. Dar s-au mai gaist si altele in Directia a V-a, si anume:

—armele de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Erau vreo 5 arme unicat cu infrarosii:

–pistoale de salon cu teava lunga pentru antrenament;

–generator de inalta frecventa pentru tortura;

–statii de emisie-receptie;

–aparatura de foto de ultimul tip;

–dosarul de pregatire al celor de la USLA. Era un dosar de aproximativ 25 cm grosime si cit am stat acolo, sa pazesc, am rasfoit aproape jumatate din el;

–dosarul cu toate tunelurile de sub Bucuresti, cu iesiri si evacuari din cladiri importante, cum sint: C.C., Cotroceni, Casa Poporului, Primaverii (cu vilele din imprejurimi si insula din lac). Pe aceste scheme se arata exact sistemul de comunicare intre ele;

–buletine de identitate cu biletul inauntru pe care scria: “disparut in timpul anchetei”;

–casetele cu toate filmele facute cu vizitele lui Ceausescu;

–trei fisete cam de 1 m fiecare, pline cu pasapoarte. De exemplu erau trei pasapoarte cu aceeasi fotografie dar cu nume diferite;

–un dosar in care erau trecute diverse persoane aflate sub supravegherea anumitor ofiteri USLA.

–Impreuna cu mine, in cladirea CC PCR–corp. B. au mai fost si cunosc acestea urmatorii: ing. Minea Radu, Catalin Constantin, Varban Viorel, Catalin Crosu, Costel Ciuhad, Neagu George, Stoica Florin, maior Puiu si capitan Visinescu–de la regimentul de garda, capitan doctor Panait de la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti. Toate cele gasite au fost filmate de catre Spiru Zeres, iar apoi predate si transportate la U.M. 01305 Bucuresti pe 23 si 24 decembrie 1989.

“S-AU GASIT LAZI INTREGI, CONTININD DE LA GLOANTE SPECIALE, PINA LA GLOANTE DE VINATOARE”

Ing. MINEA RADU (cel care s-a ocupat de primirea pazirea si predarea celor gasite in Directia a V-a):

“S-au adus din Directia a V-a in incaperea aleasa de noi la parterul C.C.-ului, urmatoarele:

–extrem de multa munitie, lazi intregi de la gloante speciale pina la gloante de vinatoare sovietice, occidentale;

–foarte multe pasapoarte, pasapoarte diplomatice, pasapoarte in alb, legitimatii de serviciu. Printre legitimatii am gasit-o pe cea a lui ADALBERT COMANESCU–seful de Stat Major al generalului Neagoe. Legitimatia asta era formata din trei parti. Functie de situatie se arata pe partea corespunzatoare, datele din interior fiind codificate: era intr-un plastic albastru, special, cred ca era magnetic, iar fotografia era color;

–o multime de lazi pe care nu le-am desfacut;

–documente secrete carate cu paturile. Printre ele erau programate de actiune pentru situatii deosebite, cu nume de cod de calculator, pentru pregatirea ofiterilor de securitate. Erau de exemplu, moduri de actiune pentru dispersarea si anihilarea grupurilor mici. Mai erau moduri de actiune in intreprinderi fara ca ofiterii respectivi sa se deconspire. La sfirsitulul unor astfel de documente era o lista cu cursanti si cu semnaturile lor. In foarte multe din listele astea preponderenta era feminina: circa trei sferturi erau femei. Din ce-am citit despre dispersarea grupurilor mari, se recomanda ca niciodata sa nu se incerce direct aceasta, ci, mai intii, sa se desfasoare actiuni pentru spargerea lor in grupuri mai mici si acestea sa se anihileze separat;

–dozimetre, contoare Geiger, osciloscoape multispot, truse electronice de depanare, calculatoare, aparatura foto;

–truse chimice de teren;

–o ladita cu obiecte de valoare (farfurii de argint masiv, grele, foarte vechi, datind de prin 1700);

–gheme intregi de sirma de platina pentru filigran;

–un stilou dozimetru, de care multi s-au speriat; era de provenienta sovietica, nichelat si gradat in multiroentgen;

—codor pentru transmisiii U.K.V. Despre acesta s-a spus la TV ca ar fi o bomba pentru a arunca in aer subsolul. S-a aflat, de fapt, de ce nu interceptam noi ceea ce transmiteau ei prin statii. Aceasta fiindca se lucra pe o frecventa putin deasupra frecventei acordate si cu aceste codoare-decodoare se lucra pentru a transmite-receptiona. Daca nu le aveati si intrai intimplator pe frecventa, nu intelegeai nimic;

–masina de codat, cu calculatoare afisate pe ea. Masina asta am predat-o cu multa grija armatei, a fost pusa numai ea intr-un TAB si transportata l adapost pe 24 decembrie 1989;

–pustile de vinatoare ale lui Ceausescu. Cineva mi-a spus ca o pusca de acel tip valora cit trei Mercedes-uri. Si acestea, impachetate separat in paturi, au fost predate armatei;

–niste truse pistoale foarte ciudate;

–seturi intregi de fiole cu substante neoparalizante, de productie occidentala;

–in sala de mese de la subsolul C.C.-ului s-au gasit doua caiete, gen condici cu numele ofiterilor de securitate care luau masa acolo;

–o lista tiparita cu intreprinderile din Bucuresti, care continea in plus numerele de telefon si camerele unde puteau fi gasiti ofiterii de securitate din intreprinderile respective. Toate acestea au fost predate actualuli maior Puiu si unui locotenent-colonel:

–agende ale fostilor demitari in care erau trecute numele si numerele de telefon ale femeilor cu care aveau legaturi amoroase. In dreptul unor astfel de nume era trecut si ce le dadusera acestora in schimb: pantofi, fustele de piele, haine, caciuli de blana etc. Intr-o dimineata l-am surprins pe Varban Viorel sunind la o astfel de femeie si incercind sa o santajeze….

Cu toate cite s-au gasit exista caseta video facuta de dl. Spiru Zeres inainte de a le fi predat armatei.

Sint in cele doua declaratii de mai sus, suficiente elemente pentru o ancheta a Politiei sau Procuraturii. Adresele celor doi nu trebuie neaparat publicate. Acestea deoarece, din cite stim, toti cei care au pus piciorul in fostul sediu C.C. au…dosare gata facute.

[Dan Badea, “GLOANTE SPECIALE SAU CE S-A MAI GASIT IN CLADIREA DIRECTIEI A V-A,” Expres, 16-22 aprilie 1991]

https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/01/26/declassified-us-department-of-state-documents-on-december-1989-ii/

https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/01/24/declassified-us-department-of-state-documents-on-december-1989-i/

related:  https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/01/18/declassified-u-s-british-and-canadian-documents-on-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989/

From the declassified documents obtained by Canadian journalist, Stanley Tromp:  http://www3.telus.net/index100/records2

11 January 1990 Moscow

…The Soviets believe the new Romanian Government, hoping to maintain economic ties with the Arab world, is downplaying evidence that “Arab terrorists” fought alongside Securitate forces.  [NOTE:  So well over two and half weeks after the Ceausescus were executed, the Soviets did not question the existence of Securitate forces fighting in December 1989.  That was an accepted fact.  The discussion refers to the Middle Eastern mercenaries who fought ALONSIDE the Securitate forces.]

5. On January 10, Poloff (Political Officer) met with Vladimir Lapshin, Chief of the Romanian in Department in the MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Socialist Countries of Europe Administration, for a readout on the (Soviet Foreign Minister) Shevardnadze visit to Bucharest.  Lapshin, who served in Romania from 1973 to 1979, participated in all of the Bucharest meetings.

ARAB TERRORISTS

7. Noting Romania’s need to develop trading ties with various countries, Lapshin suggested that the new government was attempting to “quiet down” evidence that Arab “Terrorist Squads” participated in the December fighting on the side of the Securitate.  He implied that the Soviets believed such squards existed.  In Lapshin’s view, the new government was anxious not to offend any of the Arab states with whom it wanted to maintain or develop economic ties. [NOTE:  If Lapshin wanted to discredit the new government completely, he could have said that the “Arab terrorists” were a myth and did not exist, that the Front had invented them to legitimize their seizure of power; if he was looking to express complete support for the Front, he would not have raised the possibility, as he did here, that they were lying now about the existence of the Arab terrorists for post facto political purposes.  No, the issue is that the new Romanian government, for “reasons of state,” actually more than just economic reasons as Lapshin speculates, but also for reasons of the security of Romanian citizens working in the Arab states in question–most notably, Libya–was acceding to, and cooperating in the former Securitate’s cover-up, to eliminate evidence and memory of the foreign contingent, who, along with a part of the Securitate, had fought on the losing side of the Revolution, in defense of Nicolae Ceausescu.]

For evidence, confirming Lapshin’s suspicion, see for example:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/foreign-intervention/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2015/01/04/25-for-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-romanian-revolution-25-after-the-ceausescus-were-executed-the-counter-revolution-is-disappeared-26-december-1989-24-january-1990/

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/grosescu-and-ursachi-the-romanian-revolution-in-court-i-annotated/

https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/01/24/declassified-us-department-of-state-documents-on-december-1989-i/

related:  https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/01/18/declassified-u-s-british-and-canadian-documents-on-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989/

From the declassified documents obtained by Canadian journalist, Stanley Tromp:  http://www3.telus.net/index100/records2

from 26 December 1989, US Embassy Bucharest

Another explanation is that the immediate execution might help to take the wind out of the sails of the remaining groups of Securitate terrorizing the country, but we suspect that most of these are now fighting for sheer survival, rather than loyalty to Ceausescu.

[Note here:  the issue/the question is not who was shooting, but why the Securitate were terrorizing the country.  The fact that the identity of the terrorists was not in doubt by Embassy Bucharest personnel is significant and telling.]

…This will not, of course, solve the current terrorist problems posted by the renegade “Unitati Speciale de Lupta Anti-terrorista [sic.]” (USLA), the well trained “anti-terrorist” units which continue to maraud about brazenly.

[It is unclear here if the reference is to USLA from the Securitate who did not join the Revolution, or of elements of the USLA, who did not join the Revolution…but what is clear is that the Securitate, and elements of USLA, were considered responsible for the bloodshed.]

related:  https://rolandothomassonphd.home.blog/2020/01/18/declassified-u-s-british-and-canadian-documents-on-the-romanian-revolution-of-december-1989/

From the declassified documents obtained by Canadian journalist, Stanley Tromp:  http://www3.telus.net/index100/records2

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov’s comments on 24 December 1989 to the US Ambassador to Moscow regarding renunciation of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” have previously been reported (sometimes using different phraseology, but with the same general content) in other fora:  see, for example, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin10_p5.pdf ), but here one can see the original exchange:

“In response to the Ambassador’s direct question, Aboimov once again strongly reiterated the Soviet Union’s determination not to intervene militarily in Romania’s internal affairs, noting in a clear reference to Panama that ‘We have given the Brezhnev Doctrine to you, with our compliments.'”

What has not been reported previously are Aboimov’s comments with regard to who was the cause behind the continuing bloodshed in Bucharest and the rest of Romania:

“5. With regard to the Soviet Trade Mission personnel [two of whom had allegedly been wounded per paragraph 2], Aboimov said that the apartment building where many of the Mission’s personnel lived had been the scene of serious fighting yesterday.  “Terrorists” (by which Aboimov clearly indicated he meant Securitate) had actually been in the building at one time.  There was heavy shooting and the building itself was on set on fire.  The shooting continued until midday, when the Soviet Embassy managed to evacuate Trade Mission personnel and their dependents from the building to Embassy grounds.  Two persons were lightly wounded.” [For a similar incident, suffered by British personnel, see https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/resedinta-ambasadorului-britanic-tvr-si-teroristii-updated-w-british-foreign-office-records/ )

“6.  Aboimov said the security situation around the Soviet Embassy itself was not good.  Serious firefight had erupted for one or two hours yesterday near the Embassy when a “nest of terrorists” was wiped out by Government forces…”

ROMANIA:  CIA National Intelligence Daily 28 December 1989 (declassified from Top Secret and Released to the public on 10 December 2019, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/633/cia-reports-on-the-collapse-of-communism-in-europe/5)

Romania:  New Regime Consolidating Security

The government continues to make limited progress in eliminating the threat from Securitate diehards, but Romanians are increasingly skeptical of Communist dominance of the new government.

On Tuesday [26 December 1989], the new government put internal security forces and border guards under the Defense Ministry and set a new deadline for the Securitate troops to surrender.  The government is also calling on civilians to turn in all arms issued to defeat Nicolae Ceausescu.  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Information not declassified for protection of sources and methods xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx nearly half of an estimated 200 Securitate members in Timisoara were dead, captured, or had escaped.  xxxx Classification not declassified xxxx

—

What can we learn from this?  For one thing, there is nothing here, absolutely nothing, to substantiate the claims of the military prosecutors in the Indictment of April 2019 in the so-called Dosarul Revolutiei, according to which Ion Iliescu, Gelu Voican Voiculescu, Iosif Rus, Nicolae Militaru and other military commanders are accused of having “invented” a terrorist diversion with non-existent terrorists in order to seize and legitimate their power, especially by intentionally disseminating disinformation through television.  Nor is there anything here about Generals Stanculescu, Guse, and others with blood on their hands for their role in repressing demonstrators in Timisoara giving contradictory orders and “inventing” terrorists in order to create a heroic image for the military and buy themselves immunity for their actions in Timisoara.  Nor is there anything here about everything just being about confusion, and suspicion, and mass psychosis, and accidental “friendly fire” being the dominant condition.  Nor is there anything here about the Army’s DIA (Buzau 404) or “Soviet tourists” (KGB, GRU, Spetnaz), etc. or others as being the actual terrorists engaged in a false flag operation to incriminate the Securitate.  Nor as a journalist in Romania suggested was the use of the term “Securitate diehards” inspired by the 1988 Bruce Willis film “Diehard” or was CIA “prisoners of information supplied by the [National Salvation] Front https://evenimentulistoric.ro/cia-prizonierii-informatiilor-venite-de-la-fsn-documente-inedite.html …that is why two lines are excised in the section above, precisely because of the highly sensitive level of how the information was acquired.  Finally, it should be clear, especially if one reads the entire document, that the analyst[s] who wrote this crisis piece, had no illusions about Iliescu and the Front (they saw that they were high level former communists who were already being decried by people in the streets) or that ‘free flowing arms’–arms distributed or seized by the population during the events–were a fact.  But these were facts, alongside the fact that there were Securitate terrorists fighting on behalf of Ceausescu, something which they knew from sources other than just international media or “The Front.”

Significantly, the CIA NID from 28 December 1989 is consistent with what National Security Council (NSC) Director for European Affairs Robert Hutchings maintained in 1997: “It was an argument that had a few adherents at staff level during those chaotic days, during which a successful counterrevolution by Ceausescu loyalists seemed a real danger…110. …With Moscow as with others [“Bonn, London, Paris, and other capitals”], there was a broadly shared desire to see Ceausescu loyalists defeated, the bloodshed ended, and the democratic ‘spirit of Timisoara’ vindicated.” https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/robert-hutchings-nsc-director-for-europe-89-92-on-romania-december-1989/

—

The second and third documents here are courtesy of the efforts of the Canadian journalist, Stanley Tromp (the US documents referred to are from the Department of State):

Records on the Romanian Revolution of 1989

Obtained by journalist Stanley Tromp, through the

Freedom of Information (FOI) laws of Great Britain, the United States

and Canada – 2019 http://www3.telus.net/index100/romania?fbclid=IwAR0UOkJ7l-5y7RXqkWgtfboSmeg0WcriTLqySUW-ajwqr5LOs-Z8e7XopWw

stanleytromp@gmail.com

The below is from File 5 of Records from British Foreign Office – 109 pages, page 27, from pages 26-28, a cable from Bucharest on the chronology of the Revolution, date 2 January 1990.

SATURDAY 23 DECEMBER

SECURITATE ATTACK RTV [TVR] STATION DURING NIGHT.  RESIDENCE OCCUPIED BY SECURITATE AND ATTACKED.  HMA’S [Her Majesty’s Ambassador] FAMILY ESCAPES.  EMBASSY SHREDDING STARTS.  ATTEMPT TO EVACUATE FURTHER EMBASSY STAFF BY COMMERCIAL FLIGHT FAILS.

Significantly, in File 6 from Canada’s External Affairs Department, on p. 88, from 24 December 1989, the Canadian Embassy in Bucharest also alludes to the “terrorist” attack on the British Residence.)

24 December 1989

4. FIGHTING TODAY WAS FIERCE NOISE, SPORADIC AND WIDESPREAD, REFLECTING TRUE NATURE, TRNG AND COMPETENCE OF ARMED FORCE COMPONENT OF SECURITATE. WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT NON ROMS [non-Romanians] WERE USED BY OR FORM PART OF SECURITATE THEIR BRUTALITY SINCE TIMISOARA WILL LEAVE ITS MARK OVER AND ABOVE EARLIER REPUTATION. TACTICS AND DETAILS OF THESE TERRORISTS AND THEIR OPS ARE NOW WELL BROADCAST AND PHONE CALLERS SUBSTANTIATE THE WORST.

2….OUR CDNS [CANADIANS] LEFT CHANCERY IN SEMI-DARKNESS WITH LOUD ACCOMPANIAMENT [sic.] OF AUTOMATIC AND SMALL ARMS FIRE NEARBY.  THEY SHOULD BE IN PLENTY [of] TIME TO ATTEND MIDNIGHT SERVICE AT NEVSKY CATHEDRAL IN SOFIA AND LUCKIER THAN SAY BRIT CONTINGENT WHO WERE RETICENCT TO MOVE UNTIL RESULT OF AMER [AMERICAN] EFFORT.  THEIR CONCERN BASED PROBABLY ON MORE EXPOSED POSN [POSITION] AND BLOW OF HAVING AMBS [AMBASSADOR’S] RESIDENCE BURNED TO GROUND BY TERRORISTS.

If one puts these cables side by side with what has appeared in media and on the Internet in the past several decades, there is little doubt that there is no confusion here…British Embassy Staff did not mistake soldiers, or Interior Ministry personnel fighting on the side of the Revolution, or panicked, untrained armed civilians, for those who seized the ambassador’s residence.  It was clear, they were Securitate terrorists.

See, for example, such details here:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/resedinta-ambasadorului-britanic-tvr-si-teroristii-updated-w-british-foreign-office-records/

—

Also, related to confirmation of information about December 1989, from December 2019:

https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/former-hungarian-pm-miklos-nemeth-confirms-hungarian-role-in-locating-securitate-transmitters-in-december-1989-december-2019-magyar-hang/

One would think those who support the military prosecutors and the Rechizitoriu in Dosarul Revolutiei might look around and pay attention to who else is vocally supporting these claims.

Invențiile lui Ion Iliescu despre Revoluție: „Teroriștii fideli lui Ceaușescu” și negarea existenței victimelor după 24 decembrie

Din păcate, chiar și în fața inculpării oficiale, domnul Ion Iliescu își menține opiniile teziste, demontate de mult ca false de către Istoriografie și, recent, de Rechizitoriul (aproape impecabil întocmit de magistratul Pitu și care, în afară de calitatea lui judiciară, reabilitează și Justiția română după comportamentul neprofesionist, politizat și laș din decembrie 1989 și din primele două decenii de după).

https://evz.ro/inventiile-lui-ion-iliescu-despre-revolutie-teroristii-fideli-lui-ceausescu-si-negarea-existentei-victimelor-dupa-24-decembrie.html

30 de ani de la Debutul celei mai mari Diversiuni din Istoria României

https://evz.ro/30-de-ani-de-la-debutul-celei-mai-mari-diversiuni-din-istoria-romaniei.html

https://ziaristii.com/iliescu-minte-cu-cadenta-unei-mitraliere-rusesti-despre-teroristi-si-executia-ceausestilor/

Ah, but of course…no!  Romanian commentators either mindlessly endorse the Rechizitoriu, unaware of or unconcerned about the convergence of their historical understanding with that of the likes of Stoenescu or Cristoiu:

Cum s-au omorât românii între ei la Revoluție, din ordinul CFSN și al MApN

https://newsweek.ro/istorie/cum-s-au-omorat-romanii-intre-ei-la-revolutie-din-ordinul-cfsn-si-al-mapn

Extrase din Rechizitoriul oficial despre decembrie 1989

https://ruxandracesereanu.wordpress.com/2019/12/23/extrase-din-rechizitoriul-oficial-despre-decembrie-1989/

Acum 10 ani am publicat această carte de sinteză istoriografică despre decembrie 1989, ediția a doua după cea din 2004 (cu inventarierea tuturor teoriilor de interpretare a revoluției / loviluției / lovituției). Între timp a fost încheiat (în 2019) Rechizitoriul Procuraturii despre evenimentele din decembrie 1989, al cărui prim volum are 500 de pagini. Concluzia acestui Rechizitoriu este tranșantă: până în 22 decembrie 1989, dimineața, a fost revoluție, din 22 decembrie 1989, după-amiaza a fost un fratricid orchestrat de ministrul Apărării naționale (Nicolae Militaru), cauționat de Ion Iliescu și echipa sa ajunsă la putere.

https://ruxandracesereanu.wordpress.com/2019/12/19/deconstructia-unei-revolutii-in-pdf/

or they argue that the Securitate and their allies (the likes of Stoenescu and Cristoiu) always knew how to glom on to a popular idea and argument…as Marius Mioc does…
Mioc’s analysis has long since crossed into the realm of risible, unfortunately, as can be seen by looking at just a few of the ridiculous and easily demonstrable falsehoods he has recently digested and accepted from the Rechizitoriu:

1) For example, to support his absurd obsession that Stanculescu was in fact responsible for inventing the terrorists…he cites…Ceausescu dignitary, Silviu Curticeanu:

“În ceea ce privește diversiunea, Parchetul arată, cu date concrete, implicarea lui Stănculescu. De pildă, martorul Silviu Curticeanu, fost demnitar ceaușist, indică că Stănculescu i-a zis să stea acasă și apoi a venit un TAB care a tras asupra casei sale. Discutînd cu ofițerul care comanda TABul a aflat că anume Stănculescu i-a dat ordin să deschidă focul asupra casei, fiindcă acolo s-ar afla teroriști. Ar fi fost bine ca Parchetul să identifice acel ofițer și să-i ia și lui declarație, ca să nu se bizuie rechizitoriul doar pe martori din nomenclatura comunistă.”

https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2019/11/15/rechizitoriul-in-procesul-revolutiei-12-inducerea-in-eroare-dezinformarea-si-diversiunea-inducerea-in-eroare-coordonata-si-exercitata-de-virfurile-de-comanda-militara-ale-m-ap-n-acceptarea-de-c/

Oh, yes, Curticeanu, is a really credible source with no interest in lying here.  Valentin Ceausescu also swears nobody was firing from his vila, and of course, there are declarations taken by the military prosecutors right after the events occurred, such as the following:

6 februarie 1990

Declaratie. Subsemnatul Bucurescu Giani, general-maior [D.S.S.]

La data de 28 sau 29 decembrie 1989, col. Lovescu [?] Virgil seful U.M. 0650 mi-a raportat ca…

Col. Lovescu [?] Virgil avea un subordonat a carui sotie-medic a participat la acordarea ajutorului ranitilor in luptele de la Aeroport Otopeni si la transportarea cadavrelor la I.M.L. Acestea ii relatase sotului ca in buzunarul unui terorist ucis la Otopeni, care era imbracat in trei costume de haine, unul peste altul, s-au gasit cartile de vizita ale lui Emil Bobu si Ion Dinca.

Col. L Virgil mi-a spus ca l-a frapat aceasta informatie si legat de faptul ca la postul de Radio Europa Libera se facuse afirmatie cu Pacepa ar fi precizat ca Ion Dinca se ocupase de pregatirea unor grupuri de teroristi. Alte date nu pot da intrucit informatia era in curs de clarificare ori la Col. Ratiu [DSS Dir I] ori la Col. Goran [SMB]…

Cunosc [?] faptul ca col. Ardeleanu [sef USLA] era in relatii apropriate cu familia lui Ion Dinca…

Din conducerea USLA atit col. Ardeleanu cit si col Blortz [Bleort] erau apropriatii lui T. Postelnicu
https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2013/09/07/former-securitate-officials-who-corroborated-general-iulian-vlads-declaration-on-the-terrorists-liviu-turcu-ion-mihai-pacepa-radu-vasilevici-marian-romanescu-and-others/

Moreover, Mioc seems to have forgotten what he wrote when the above mentioned Stoenescu invoked Curticeanu as a source (even though the vaunted Rechizitoriu Mioc so embraces does the same thing!):

Pentru a dovedi că sabotarea mitingului din 21 decembrie nu a fost făcută de simpli bucureşteni, ci de agenturi străine, Stoenescu foloseşte mărturii vagi ale unor persoane care nu pot identifica nimic exact, modul său de gîndire fiind: iată, cineva misterios a sabotat mitingul, deci sigur e mîna agenturilor străine. Se foloseşte declaraţia lui Silviu Curticeanu, care a văzut mitingul de la fereastra biroului său din Comitetul Central, şi care a concluzionat că evenimentele au fost create „cu sînge rece de un regizor abil, care a avut la îndemînă mijloacele necesare, de la cele mai simple pînă la cele mai complicate (bastoane cu ace la vîrf, petarde, aparatură electronică)” (pag. 227). Declaraţia lui Siviu Curticeanu nu ar trebui folosită într-o carte serioasă de istoria revoluţiei, din cel puţin trei motive: martorul e unul din cei ajunşi la puşcărie după 1989 anume pentru faptul că a aprobat reprimarea revoluţiei, deci nu e obiectiv ci direct interesat în promovarea teoriei lui Ceauşescu despre agenturile străine; a văzut întîmplările de la distanţă, nu putea să observe cu exactitate ce s-a întîmplat; nu relatează fapte, ci speculaţii.
https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2008/10/20/gresita-distinctie-a-lui-alex-stoenescu-%e2%80%9cdiversiune%e2%80%9d-si-%e2%80%9crevolta-populara%e2%80%9d-i/

2) Mioc is a virulent critic of the idea of “Russian tourists,” but in order to accept the other claims about the radioelectronic war by Ion Mateescu, he conveniently draws no attention to the following gem by Mateescu, because it reflects poorly on Mateescu’s crediblity…it would appear…Mateescu believes in “Russian tourists”:
Precizez că situaţia concretă din decembrie 1989, fiind emis indicativul militar „Radu cel Frumos” – alarmă parţială de luptă, permitea trecerea pe frecvenţa de război. Pe baza experienţei profesionale apreciez că bruiajul asupra sistemelor de radio-locaţie a fost făcut din interior, eventul cu participarea unor specialişti sovietici veniţi în ţară ca turişti. Existau forţe militare interne care aveau ca obiect de activitate diversiunea, inclusiv cea radio-electronică.

https://mariusmioc.wordpress.com/2019/12/02/rechizitoriul-in-dosarul-revolutiei-14-inducerea-in-eroare-dezinformarea-si-diversiunea-diversiunea-radio-electronica-componenta-a-inducerii-in-eroare/

In Mateescu’s claims about Tirgoviste, it becomes clear he is rather a dissembler, with a penchant for the tall tale…and is diametrically at odds with details such as the following:

“Totodata eu cred ca (seful Securitatii locale, Col.) Dinu nu era strain de actiunile desfasurate impotriva unitatii. De pilda, intr-o noapte, m-a scos afara, in curtea unitatii, si auzind in oras zgomote, imi spunea, ‘Fii atent, astea sunt ABI-uri…In 10 minute, incep sa traga…’ Stia totul, de parca isi confirma un plan cunoscut dinainte. Si mi-a mai spus, ‘Teroristii si antiteroristii sunt pregatiti dupa aceleasi principii si reguli, fac aceeasi instructie.’”

Captain Gheorge Bobric’s recounting of Securitate Col. Dinu’s comment, according to which “…notice, those are ABIs [Securitate USLA vehicles]…in ten minutes, firing will begin…The terrorists and anti-terrorists are trained  according to the same principles and rules, they go through the same training.” p. 157

For example, Boboc continues: 

“Then, there was Major Oancea, also from the county Securitate.  Hardly had he come from his mission in Timisoara, on 22 December, but he presented himself to Kemenici (at a time when all the Securitate personnel had been sent home) and he “surrendered to the Revolution.”  Kemenici accepted him and dressed him in an Army soldier’s uniform, armed and with the appropriate patch (?), and held him in the unit.  He walked through the unit with missions assigned to him by the Kemenici-Dinu tandem.  But his principal mission was to investigate with captain Stoian–the Securitate’s military counter-intelligence officer for the unit, the terrorists captured and brought to the barracks.

“For example, I brought one, turned over by revolutionaries, who had been captured shooting in MICRO 11.  He was covered in blood, armed, had an ID from Botosani, and was named Balan.  And there were were many other such suspects given to the two investigators.  In the night before the trial they all disappeared, without a trace, from arrest in the unit.  As did Major Oancea!”
https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/the-ceausescu-trial-paper-airplanes-and-whiskey-or-when-prose-and-innuendo-substitute-for-historical-research/

3) Mioc also continues to propagate and repeat some of the Parchet’s most easily disconfirmed claims:

De asemenea, probele administrate demonstrează că la 23.12.1989 gl. lt. (r.) Rus Iosif a dat ordin ca elicopterelor de la Regimentul 61 Boteni să le fie schimbate prin revopsire, cocardele tricolore de pe fuzelaj cu alte însemne, de alt format geometric.

The “alt format geometric” was the rectangle of the Romanian flag, and it was painted on the 22nd during the search for the Ceausescus, not on the 23rd:

Marian Pavel (r): “Dupa ce Nicolae si Elena Ceausescu au fost lasati in camp, maior Suciu a ordonat la S.L.A sa vopsim cocardele de pe burta elicopterelor, care erau sub forma de stea…” (Eroica, 2015)

These are just a few of Mioc’s many mistakes in his review of the Rechizitoriu.